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HUME, MIRACLES, AND MATHEMATICS:  
A CASE STUDY FOR THE USE AND PREVALENCE 
OF PROBABILISTIC ARGUMENTATION 
WITHIN BIBLICAL STUDIES 
 
Joshua Brickell 
 
In David Hume's Enquiry, he states: "No testimony is 
sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of 
such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than 
the fact, which it endeavours to establish... the superior only 
gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which 
remains, after deducting the inferior."1 Hume's statement may 
seem captive to the realm of philosophy. One could discuss 
how Hume eventually dismisses the existence of miracles not 
because he sees them as theoretically impossible, but rather 
because no witness could ever be reliable enough to show oth-
erwise. But as Holder, Sobel,2 Owen,3 and others argue, 
Hume's statement is inherently mathematical. While these 
scholars have differing opinions as to whether miracles exist 
or not, all interpret Hume's statement in light of Bayes' theo-
rem, a statistical technique developed by Thomas Bayes. In 
this paper, I will analyze the debate about Hume and miracles, 
arguing that under certain conditions the existence of a miracle 
                                                
1 Rodney Holder, "Hume on Miracles: Bayesian Interpretation, 
Multiple Testimony, and the Existence of God." The British Jour-
nal for the Philosophy of Science 49, no 1 (1998): 50. (quoting 
Hume's Enquiry) 
2 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 166-186. 
3 David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Proba-
bilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 187-202. 
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could be rationally accepted. This discussion about Hume will 
serve as a case study, showing how mathematics and specifi-
cally probability can be integral to analyzing important ques-
tions present in philosophy and religion. I will then explore 
more broadly the realm of biblical studies, arguing that bibli-
cal historians frequently employ probabilistic argumentation 
and mathematical reasoning when assessing the truthfulness 
of biblical narratives. Finally, I will suggest that given the case 
study about miracles and the commonplace of probabilistic 
language in biblical studies, having a degree of mathematical 
literacy can be a useful and important tool in dissecting the 
arguments made by biblical historians today. 
   
Hume and Bayes' Theorem 
 
In Rodney Holder's article on Hume and miracles, he 
interprets Hume's statement above to be making an argument 
that draws upon the logic of Bayesian probabilities. Here, 
Hume brings up two significant probabilities: the probability 
of a witness making false testimony, and the a priori probabil-
ity of a miracle occurring. Seeing the probabilities that Hume 
has stressed in his analysis, Holder uses Bayes' Theorem to 
mathematically express Hume's argument. Bayes' Theorem is 
a statistical technique that combines the use of a priori and 
conditional probabilities4 in order to assess the likelihood of 
the event in question. In this case, the central event in question 
is this: what is the probability of a specific miracle having oc-
curred (denoted by the variable "M" in the formulas to follow), 
given an individual's testimony to that specific miracle occur-
ring (denoted "T"). Using these variables, Bayes' Theorem is 
as follows, where  P(T | M) is the conditional probability that 
testimony would be provided given that the miracle occurred, 
and P(T | ~M) is the conditional probability that an individual 
                                                
4 A conditional probability is the probability of event A occurring 
given that event B occurred and is denoted P(A|B). 
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41 
would provide testimony to the miracle occurring given that 
the miracle did not actually occur: 
 ! "	 $) = ' $ " ∗' )' $ " ∗' ) *	' $ ~" ∗'(~)) 
 
Since Hume argues that miracles are intrinsically improbable, 
the P(M) << 1 (a really small number), and the P(~M)=1 (tech-
nically, very close to 1). If the miracle occurs and someone is 
there to see it, it is almost certain that it will get reported, so 
P(T|M) = 1. Using Hume’s assumptions and inserting these 
values, the following is left: 
  ! "	 $) = ! "! " + 	!($|~") 
 
Holder argues that for a miracle to be "rationally acceptable"5 
the probability of the miracle occurring given the testimony 
about that miracle must be greater than 0.5. Using the equation 
above, this means we are looking for what is greater, the a pri-
ori probability that the miracle occurred, or the probability that 
the witness testified to the specific miracle occurring, given 
that the miracle did not actually occur. Mathematically ex-
pressed: 
 
 ! " > 	! $ ~" 	012034567	86906:	01	4	;0<43=9>=7	6?615	07	<450>149, ! " < 	! $ ~" 	012034567	86906:	01	;0<43=9>=7	6?615	07	1>5	<450>149 
 
Notice this is exactly where Hume left us, comparing the prob-
abilities of a miraculous event to the conditional probability of 
false testimony. 
                                                
5 Rodney Holder, "Hume on Miracles: Bayesian Interpretation, 
Multiple Testimony, and the Existence of God." The British Jour-
nal for the Philosophy of Science 49, no 1 (1998):  51. 
(Eq. 3) 
(Eq. 1) 
(Eq. 2) 
( I C I ) c ) Cl)C) Cl) 
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 Now that the basics of Bayes’ Theorem have been laid 
out, in order to assess whether or not Hume’s intuition and ar-
guments against miracles hold weight when expressed mathe-
matically, we must explore the assumptions and simplifica-
tions used by later scholars who agree and disagree with 
Hume’s analysis. Owen, in his article assessing Hume’s argu-
ment and its Bayesian interpretation, makes some assumptions 
that cause him to diverge from Holder. Owen of course holds 
to the basic Bayes’ Theorem presented in equation 1 above. 
However, he then proceeds to use a simplification of equation 
1 in his analysis of Hume’s arguments:6  
 
 
 ! "	 $) = ! $ " ∗ ! "! $ " ∗ ! " + (1 − ! $ " ) ∗ !(~") 
 
Note the only difference here between Holder and Owen is that 
Owen replaces ! $ ~" 	with	(1 − ! $ " ). Owen notes 
that these two expressions are equal so long as ! $ " =	!(~$|~"), where the last conditional probability means that 
the witness testified to any event other than event M, given 
that event M did not occur. As will be seen later, whether or 
not one accepts this as a justifiable becomes crucial in deter-
mining whether or not Hume's logic makes sense mathemati-
cally.  
 The issue with Owen's logic here is his assumption re-
garding the equality above. The variable T refers to a witness 
testifying that the specific event M occurred. So then, the ne-
gation of this statement, ~T, here refers to the same witness 
                                                
6 To keep mathematical notation consistent throughout this paper, I 
have translated Owen’s notation into the notation already expressed 
by Holder. Owen uses the notation as follows:  = H5H5 + (1 − H)(1 − 5) 
(Eq. 4) 
( I ( I ) ( ) (I)() (I) 
( I ) ( I ) 
( I ) 
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making a testimony about some other event occurring. This 
could be any number of possible events, so long as the testi-
mony is not about event M occurring. Thus, the event ~$ ∩~" (meaning not T and not M) would include any possible 
scenarios where the witness testifies about an event other than 
M (or perhaps does not testify at all), and M does not actually 
occur. For example, say event A actually occurred, and the 
witness testified that event B occurred (the witness did not ac-
curately report what happened). This scenario would be con-
sistent with the expression  ~$ ∩ ~", as would a scenario 
where event A actually occurred, and the witness testified that 
event A actually occurred (the witness accurately reported 
what happened). How does this compare to the event $ ∩ "? 
The only scenario consistent with this expression is the sce-
nario where the witness testifies that event M occurred, and 
event M did occur. Given the disparity between the number of 
compatible scenarios with each of these events, it would be 
incredibly unlikely that ! $ " = 	!(~$|~"). Given this, 
why does Owen make this error? If we are being sympathetic 
to Owen here, it appears that he means that the probability that 
the witness would testify to event M giving that M occurred 
should be equal to the probability that the witness would tes-
tify to a different event, say event A, given that event A actu-
ally occurred. Holder argues along a similar vein when noting 
his difference with Owen, saying that by being more careful 
with formulating the language used in describing the variables, 
the matter cannot be simplified the way Owen does.7 It is im-
portant to stress here that Holder and Owen are not doing 
vastly different math: their approaches to this problem are 
quite similar. Rather, Holder is a bit more precise in how he 
defines his terms, and this leads to him rejecting one assump-
tion that Owen makes. 
                                                
7 Rodney Holder, "Hume on Miracles: Bayesian Interpretation, 
Multiple Testimony, and the Existence of God." The British Jour-
nal for the Philosophy of Science 49, no 1 (1998):  52.  
C I ) 
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 As has already been shown, Holder disagrees with the 
way Owen simplifies !($|~"). Holder's logic centers around 
how he defines his terms: "our background knowledge K is 
that W [the witness] is in a position to make a report on what 
occurs and does so. T is, specifically a testimony for M, i.e. 
'W states the M occurred'. But given that M did not occur there 
are many ways for W [the witness] to give a false report... and 
it is most unlikely that the false report W would come up with 
is M."8 This leads Holder to provide the following formula:9 
 
 
 ! $ ~" = ! J	K0?67	4	:4976	<6H><5 ∗ ! 5ℎ6	:4976	<6H><5	J	K0?67	07	$  = (1 − 5) ∗ (1/1) 
 
Again it must be stressed that the difference between Holder 
and Owen is small. All Holder does is recognize that if the 
witness were to give a false report, there are other possible 
false reports other than the exact event M. While the difference 
in their assumptions is small, this can produce a large effect 
on the end results. Factoring Holder's assumption into equa-
tion 2 and rearranging terms we have the following: 
 
 
 ! " > 1 − 5 ∗ 11  012034567	4	;0<43=9>=7	6?615	341	86	<450>1499N	4336H562, 
 ! " < 	 1 − 5 ∗ 11  	012034567	4	;0<43=9>=7	6?615	3411>5	86	<450>1499N	4336H562 
                                                
8 Rodney Holder, "Hume on Miracles: Bayesian Interpretation, 
Multiple Testimony, and the Existence of God." The British Jour-
nal for the Philosophy of Science 49, no 1 (1998): 52.  
9 n here is the endless numbers of false reports that one could 
choose from. 
(Eq. 6) 
(Eq. 5) 
( I ) ( ) ( 
( ) ( ) (-) 
( ) ( ) (-) 
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Now Holder assumes that n would be sufficiently large, sug-
gesting that there are a multitude of false reports to choose 
from. However, Holder's argument goes too far here, as it 
would be more likely that there are only a couple other expla-
nations that one could be reasonably expected to testify to. For 
example, if one saw a healing and testified to a miracle occur-
ring, there would be a couple other ways to possibly testify 
about the event: the work of a particular medicine, or the care 
of a doctor. So for our case, n would be greater than 1, but not 
very large. Even with this adjustment to Holder's argument, he 
still seems to have supplied a way in which one could ration-
ally accept that a miracle has occurred. This is not the same as 
saying that Holder has proved that a particular miracle has oc-
curred, or that this formula could determine if a specific event 
was a miracle. Rather, it is a response to Hume's earlier state-
ment from his Enquiry, that in certain cases it may be rational 
to accept the existence of a miracle based on witness testi-
mony.   
 
Objections to Hume and the use of Bayesian Statistics 
 
 So far our discussion around Hume's argument against 
miracles is that using a formula like Bayes' theorem, centered 
around the idea of conditional probability, is an appropriate 
way to measure the reliability of testimony and the probability 
of a miracle (or any other event) occurring. While on different 
sides of the debate as to whether Hume was correct,  Owen 
and Holder both agree that interpreting Hume in a Bayesian 
manner is appropriate, and that using prior probabilities in as-
sessing the likelihood of a particular occurrence is a valid ap-
proach. However, there are some who have questioned the 
logic of using prior probabilities in assessing the reliability of 
witness testimony. In this next section, the thoughts of Richard 
Price, an eighteenth century mathematician, and David Cohen, 
a twentieth century philosopher, will be explored. Both Cohen 
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and Price offer arguments as to why this probabilistic reason-
ing is an inappropriate way to measure things such as witness 
reliability. Furthermore, Cohen and Price show how this topic 
has implications far beyond the field of miracles, affecting 
things such as the reliability of a courtroom witness to the re-
liability of medical tests for diseases. Finally, we will examine 
the objections brought by Sobel, who argues that there are 
some limitations to Bayes' theorem, and provides examples 
where our intuition may show Bayes' theorem to not be en-
tirely reasonable. 
 Sobel quotes Price as saying that, "the turning point in 
Mr. Hume's argument is... the principle, that no testimony 
should engage our belief, except the improbability in the false-
hood of it is greater than that in the event which it attests... he 
[Price] maintains 'that improbabilities as such do not lessen the 
capacity of testimony to report truth."10 Price provides a num-
ber of examples to show his case. His cases can generally be 
characterized as examples that appeal to our intuition, where 
we might be led to believe a trustworthy source despite the fact 
that there are long odds that the event being reported would 
actually occur. For example, Price provides the example of a 
newspaper that is generally accurate two out of every three 
times. This newspaper one day "reported the loss of a ferry 
boat during a crossing it had previously made safely two thou-
sand times. In this case, Price asserts, "testimony that is accu-
rate only two out of three times would overcome odds of thou-
sands to one against."11 In addition, Price offers another reason 
                                                
10 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 177, quoting Richard 
Price's 4th dissertation.  
11 David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Proba-
bilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 194.  
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that prior probabilities should not usually be relevant. Owen 
attempts to sympathetically give the case for Price's second 
argument as follows: "One could argue that the likelihood of 
the event reported, or the distribution of past occurrences or 
non-occurrences, is independent of the accuracy of the testi-
mony, so that when we are to consider whether or not to be-
lieve testimony, only its accuracy should be taken into ac-
count."12 
 Owen also examines the arguments of a more recent 
philosopher, L.J. Cohen. Cohen comes to similar conclusions 
that Price does, but along a slightly different vein. Cohen will 
accept the use of prior probabilities and conditional statements 
when discussing the case of long term frequencies of a certain 
event, just like Hume. But if the concern is with the likelihood 
of one particular instance of an event occurring, the prior prob-
abilities should be ignored.13 This has some quite practical im-
plications. Say one is experiencing health symptoms indicat-
ing that he or she has either disease A or B.14 For every 20 
people experiencing symptoms, 19 have A and 1 has B. We 
also know that the test is 80% accurate. Cohen might want to 
point out that if one was to use Bayes' theorem the probability 
                                                
 Another example with the same newspaper is given, where 9 
highly improbable events occur. Price alleges that Hume's probabil-
istic reasoning would lead us to believe none, despite the fact that 
with 9 events and a fairly accurate newspaper, it seems reasonable 
to think that we ought to believe some of them! 
12 David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Proba-
bilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 195. Owen claims that Price's 
original argument does not mount much of a challenge to Hume, 
and so reformulates it in a way that provides a stronger attack 
against Hume's position. 
13 David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Proba-
bilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 196.  
14 See Cohen describe this example on p. 196-198 
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that one actually has disease B, given that a B test result is 
provided, is only 17.39%.15 
 
 
 
 ! ℎ4?6	2076476	O H>7050?6	O	5675 = .QR∗.RS.QR∗.RS*.TS∗.UR = 17.39% 
 
If it is true that given a positive B test, there is only a 17.39% 
chance of actually having the B disease, then many might turn 
to wonder and ask, what is the point of taking the test at all?
 But if we ignored the prior probabilities when as-
sessing the chance that one particular individual has the dis-
ease, then we might decide to trust the results of the test. Owen 
describes how this is not simply a matter of academic debate, 
but has important applications: "suppose that the likelihood of 
a nuclear attack is one in a thousand, but that the accuracy of 
one's radar or other early warning devices is only about 99.8%. 
Would it be rational to act on the information given by one's 
equipment, or more rational not to set up such warning devices 
at all?"16 
 Owen's response to Price and Cohen's objections cen-
ters around the need for specificity of language. Recall the 
medical test, where the test is accurate 80% of the time. What 
does 80% of the time mean? If it means that looking at the 
subset of the population who have disease B, the test is correct 
80% of the time, then we will get the surprising result above, 
where even if one tests positive for disease B, using Bayes' 
                                                
15 How we interpret the statement "accurate 80% of the time" really 
affects how this is calculated. This will be explored in the next sec-
tion on precision of language. Also, this is meant purely as a hypo-
thetical example, and is not an attempt to say that medical tests for 
diseases are not accurate enough to be worth taking.  
16 David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Proba-
bilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 197. 
(Eq. 7) 
( ) 
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theorem it would not make sense to trust the results of the test. 
But, what if 80% accuracy meant that if one tested positive for 
disease B, one had an 80% chance of actually having disease 
B? Well this would drastically change one's thinking, and if an 
individual tested positive for disease B, it would be quite log-
ical to trust the results of the test! Where Cohen has confused 
his readers with his disease example is that he has been am-
biguous with language that could cause one to mistake the 
value for the !(ℎ4?6	O|5675	H>7050?6	:><	O) conditional 
with the !(5675	H>7050?6	:><	O|ℎ4?6	O). What we are look-
ing for in the final answer is former, but the example presents 
the 80% as if it should be final answer intuitively, and then 
uses the .8 figure as the latter probability in erroneously calcu-
lating Bayes' Theorem. Owen provides sufficient explanations 
to the rest of Price and Cohen's objections, which center 
around the same idea of ambiguous language. Owen is not 
providing a math lesson here: rather, the point to be made is 
linguistic. When using variations of the terms credible, relia-
ble, and accurate, we must be acutely aware of and careful to 
define what those terms mean. A lack of specificity of lan-
guage here creates the confusion highlighted in our previous 
examples. 
 Another interesting possible objection made against 
Hume/Bayesian probabilities comes from Sobel. in his reac-
tion to the important work of Tversky and Kahneman.17 
Tversky and Kahneman give an experiment where they tell the 
following story: 85 taxicabs in a town are green, and the other 
15 are blue. One taxicab is in an accident at night, where a 
witness, who can correctly identify the color 80% of the time, 
has identified the taxicab as blue. Kahneman and Tversky ask 
their subjects, what is the probability that the taxicab in the 
                                                
17 he is specifically citing their 1977 work, "Casual Thinking in 
Judgment under Uncertainty." Tversky and Kahneman here say that 
there taxicab experiments imply that people are irrational in their 
decision making. Sobel provides another possible way to tell the 
story of the results of their experiments. 
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accident was blue? The median response in their experiment 
was that there is an 80% chance that the cab is blue. Respond-
ents to this scenario had no intuitive idea of Bayes' Theorem 
and conditional probability, and "when updating initial proba-
bilities for the taxicab's being blue, these subjects in fact ig-
nored them and set them aside."18 If the experiment ended 
here, it would be no more than a real life example of an exper-
iment almost identical to the hypotheticals concerning news-
papers and disease testing above. But, Tversky and Kahneman 
take things one step farther: they do the exact same experi-
ment, except instead of telling respondents that 85% of cabs 
are green and 15% are blue, they say that 85% of cabs involved 
in accidents are green and 15% of cabs involved in accidents 
are blue, providing no information as to the general percentage 
of taxicabs in the city. Given the same question as before, 
these subjects respond much differently than those told about 
the general ratio of taxicabs, as the median response is that 
there is a 55% chance that the taxicab was actually blue. In 
either scenario, if the subjects had responded by using Bayes' 
theorem, all would have answered 41%, which is much closer 
to the answer given by the second group of respondents. The 
typical response to this experiment might be that it shows how 
people's intuition is irrational and does not line up with the 
math. But, another explanation is that the Bayesian formula-
tion we have been using might not be as robust as originally 
thought. In this experiment, which is a stronger piece of evi-
dence that the specific taxicab in the accident might not actu-
ally be blue: 85% of cabs in the city are green, or 85% of cabs 
involved in accidents in the city are green? The latter, as it 
provides an additional piece of relevant information. If we 
only knew the former, and were then asked the expected ratio 
of blue to green cabs in accidents, 41% would be the correct 
                                                
18 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 182. 
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answer. But the actual ratio in question will have some varia-
tion from our expected value. This means that using Bayes' 
theorem to find the results in both scenarios will lead to an 
accurate answer, in that in both scenarios the calculations will 
have been done correctly in accordance with the data given. 
Where these two scenarios differ is in their precision: scenario 
two has more detailed information and therefore we should 
have a higher level of confidence in them. To put another way, 
both Bayesian formulations give us a 41% chance that the cab 
is actually blue, but we can trust the 41% figure in scenario 
two more than we can trust the 41% figure in scenario one. 
Note also that in both scenarios, we did not change the relia-
bility of the witness to the crash: the variance in confidence 
we have in our answer is so far due to completely to the dif-
ference in the quality of other prior evidence. 
 Sobel has a similar argument here. In his assessment 
that normal Bayesian probabilities may not always accurately 
reflect the situation at hand, he imagines how a perfectly ra-
tional being who is limited in data and capacities but logically 
omniscient in that he or she is quite certain of every logical 
necessity might assess the total credence-state of a particular 
problem.19 "The main thing to say is that it might be better 
represented by a many-membered set of probability functions 
than by any single probability functions."20 A Bayesian prob-
ability function might be a member of this set of functions, but 
not the only one used. These functions would then be com-
bined into  singular probabilities, which would be a sort of 
weighted average based on the accuracy and precision of the 
data available. These singular probabilities could be described 
by their quantities and qualities. The quantities are easy 
                                                
19 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 183. 
20 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 183. 
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enough to describe, as the end results from the calculation, for 
the example the 41% probability derived previously. Qualities, 
"would correspond to what some might term the 'weights' or 
'degrees of ambiguity' of evidential bases for propositions, and 
to the confidence a person had in his various 'singular proba-
bilities', displayed perhaps in his readiness to accept bets based 
on them."21 In Tversky and Kahneman's example, I am more 
likely to place bets based on the second scenario rather than 
the first, despite the fact that both Bayesian probabilities are 
the same.  
 What conclusions can we draw from these objections 
to Hume and Bayesian probabilistic thinking? We can cer-
tainly see that we must certainly be careful in our language, 
and that terms such as reliability, credibility, and accuracy can 
mean different things depending on their context. In Owen's 
example, if a test is advertised as 80% accurate, does that mean 
that considering those who have the disease the "test is right 
80% of the time," or does it mean that considering those whom 
the test indicates as having the disease, "it is right 80% of the 
time?"22 As we have seen, these two statements mean drasti-
cally different things. By following Owen's lead, recognizing 
and clearing up some of the ambiguity in our language, it is 
fair to say that Price and Cohen's main objections to Hume and 
Bayes can be accounted for. While being more careful in our 
language can alleviate us from the objections of Price and Co-
hen, Sobel's critique is more interesting. Sobel does not claim 
that Bayesian statistics provide wrong or inaccurate results to 
a situation at hand; rather, he illustrates that Bayes' Theorem, 
                                                
21 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony 
 for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analy-
sis." The Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 184. 
22 David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Proba-
bilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 198. 
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while a good tool to use, is limited in its ability to assess the 
quality23 of the evidence at hand. 
   
Revisiting Miracles in Light of Sobel's Objection 
 
 Earlier, I concluded that given Holder and Owen's 
work interpreting Hume's statements on miracles in ways con-
sistent with Bayes' theorem, Hume misses the mark on deny-
ing the existence of miracles based on probabilities, and that 
there could be cases where it may be reasonable to believe that 
a miracle has occurred. And while Sobel's argument using just 
Bayes' theorem is nearly identical and reaches the same con-
clusion as Owen, Sobel's argument that Bayes' theorem may 
not be all we need to look at when considering evidence of 
prior probabilities could be a strong counter to Holder and is 
essential to this discussion. When Sobel applies his additional 
argument to the miracle situation, he claims that that an indi-
vidual's singular priors for and against miracles will be of the 
highest qualities. As he says, "probabilities averaged of such 
miracles, given their unambiguous inconsistency with what 
one takes to be the natural and necessary order of nature, will 
be concentrated closely around the average value."24 Sobel is 
saying that the argument against miracles is like the second 
taxicab scenario, in that the quality of evidence (related to the 
prior probability that miracles are highly improbable) is ex-
tremely high. He claims that, "it is not that probabilities for 
miracles are apt to be of extraordinarily low and infinitesimal 
                                                
23 As Jordan Howard Sobel defines it, described previously in rela-
tion to confidence levels or the precision of the data at hand. 
24 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 184. 
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quantities, but that they are apt to be extraordinarily 'concen-
trated' and 'focused', and of highest quality."25 This last state-
ment summarizes the key assumption in Sobel's argument. He 
does believe that the probability of a miracle is low; but his 
primary argument here is that one should have a high degree 
of confidence in this low probability. 
 Sobel's arguments about confidence levels in prior 
probabilities are not specifically addressed by Holder. How-
ever interestingly enough, Holder does provide different ex-
amples of scenarios where we may be able to have more con-
fidence in support of a result that provides evidence for the 
reasonability of a miracle. Holder's additional arguments cen-
ter around the difference between individual and multiple in-
dependent testimony. It is intuitive that if there were two peo-
ple who independently testified to the occurrence of event M, 
then to use Sobel's terms both the quantity and quality of the 
resulting probability would be higher. The higher quality of 
this singular probability can be explained as being akin to a 
larger sample size in a poll. Having a poll with 500 people is 
going to create a result that has lower variance than a poll 
showing the same result but with only 100 people. Both 
Holder and Sobel's additional arguments, beyond the basics of 
explaining Bayes' theorem, center around the quality of the ev-
idence and the confidence level one would apply to the final 
probability. Unfortunately, their arguments here sidestep each 
other. One could perhaps rebut Sobel, claiming that he is mak-
ing a huge assumption about the extremely high quality of a 
singular prior of a miracle occurring. Sobel does not give 
much justification for this assumption, other than saying that 
we all know that miracles do not occur, therefore the quality 
of our prior evidence against miracles is high. But in a discus-
sion where Sobel's conclusion is that belief in a miracle is not 
reasonable, it would seem circular to suggest that the evidence 
                                                
25 Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Mira-
cles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The 
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 185. 
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for this is that we know miracles do not occur.  On the other 
side, one could take issue with Holder by claiming that he cre-
ates a very neat and clean world in order to perform his math-
ematical analysis. For example, Holder assumes a highly reli-
able and trustworthy witness; how do we know if this 
condition is fulfilled in the real world? Furthermore, Holder 
assumes independent multiple testimony; it is an open ques-
tion how often this condition could actually be fulfilled. All in 
all, my earlier assertion that given Hume's formulation, we 
should disagree with him and leave open the option that there 
could be cases where we could reasonably believe in the ex-
istence of a miracle, still holds weight given these additional 
arguments. However, the further arguments of multiple inde-
pendent testimony and the quality of singular priors present 
quite a challenging situation to analyze. Needless to say, there 
is much room for further research and analysis on these two 
advancements of the argument beyond the basic Bayesian for-
mula.         
 
Probabilistic Language in Biblical Studies 
 
 So far, we have examined David Hume's probabilistic 
argument against the existence of miracles, and responses 
from modern day mathematicians and philosophers on both 
sides who use Bayes' theorem as the foundation for their argu-
ment in support of or against Hume. Overall, Holder's argu-
ment using Bayes' theorem is convincing, and should be seen 
as strong evidence that there could be cases where belief in the 
occurrence of a miracle is rational. However, given Sobel and 
Holder's arguments that go beyond the scope of the basic 
Bayesian formulation, the waters become muddied, and I have 
no tidy conclusion to offer. But, the purpose of this paper is 
not to prove Hume right or wrong; rather, it is to use the debate 
around Hume's argument as a case study for how scholars 
across disciplines integrate mathematical language and con-
cepts into arguments that may at first glance seem to have 
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nothing to do with math at all. If convinced of this, a few ques-
tions no doubt arise. First, why do scholars use this sort of lan-
guage? Second, is probabilistic or mathematical reasoning an 
appropriate way to evaluate truth claims in the humanities? In 
the natural sciences the scientific method and statistical eval-
uation certainly dominate in the quest for truth. (although I 
would argue the conclusions drawn from the data involve a 
certain amount of storytelling as well) So is expressing argu-
ments couched in probabilities and conditionals the humani-
ties version of the scientific method? And finally, do scholars' 
probabilistic statements make sense when expressed mathe-
matically? In this concluding section, I will zoom in on the 
field of biblical studies, to provide some examples of this sort 
of language being used and analyze the role it plays in devel-
oping arguments. 
 In discussing how biblical historians assess the histor-
ical truth of events in the bible, Bart Ehrman states that, "His-
torians more or less rank past events on the basis of the relative 
probability that they occurred. All that historians can do is 
show what probably happened in the past."26 N.T. Wright sees 
the biblical historian as one who is, "looking... at evidence 
about the past, trying to reconstruct the probable course of 
events... defending such reconstructions.... on the scientific 
grounds of getting in the data, doing so with appropriate sim-
plicity, and shedding light on other areas of research."27 Mar-
cus Borg discusses how empirical verification has become a 
staple of the modern worldview, forcing one to reduce truth, 
"to factuality, either scientifically verifiable or historically re-
liable facts."28 Ernst Renan, arguing that the lack of modern 
day miracles should cause great doubt that biblical miracles 
                                                
26 Bart Ehrman, Jesus, Interrupted: (New York, NY: HarperCollins 
Publishers,  2009), 175. 
27 Marcus Borg and N.T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus: Two Vi-
sions (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 17. 
28 Ibid., 10. 
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occurred states that, "If it is proved that no contemporary mir-
acle will bear inquiry, is it not probable that the miracles of the 
past... would equally present their share of illusion, if it were 
possible to criticise them in detail?"29 As we can see from a 
brief survey of prominent biblical historians, the common her-
meneutic in analyzing texts and their historical truth claims is 
to gather data, see what is verifiable, and then to express what 
is probable, possible, or unlikely to have occurred. This is ex-
actly what the Jesus Seminar of the 1980s and 1990s set out to 
do, organizing Jesus' statements by whether they believed Je-
sus said something like what was written down, probably said 
what was written, did not say what was written but contains 
his ideas, or did not say the passage and the passage does not 
come from Jesus' tradition. Biblical historians follow this ap-
proach because we are captives of this worldview, as Borg 
says, "like all worldviews, it functions in our minds almost un-
consciously, affecting what we think possible and what we pay 
attention to."30  
 While not outright rejecting the use the of probabilis-
tic reasoning and empirical verification to assess the veracity 
of biblical truth claims, Borg does claim that this approach 
should certainly not be the exclusive way of assessing the truth 
of the bible. As he states, "I realized that there are well-authen-
ticated experiences that radically transcend what the modern 
worldview can accommodate. I became aware that the modern 
worldview is itself a cultural construction, the product of a par-
ticular era in human intellectual history."31 This is evident in 
his explanation of the truth of the post-Easter Jesus: 
  
the truth of Easter itself, does not depending upon 
their [Easter stories] being literally and historically 
                                                
29 Ernest Renan, The Life of Jesus (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus 
Books, 1991), 22. 
30 Marcus Borg and N.T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus: Two Vi-
sions (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 10. 
31 Ibid., 11. 
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factual. For me, the historical ground of Easter is very 
simple: the followers of Jesus, both then and now, 
continued to experience Jesus as a living reality after 
his death... Those experiences have taken a variety of 
forms. They include dramatic forms such as visions 
and mystical experiences, and less dramatic forms 
such as a sense of the presence of Jesus... The truth of 
Easter is grounded in these experiences, not in what 
happened (or didn't happen) on a particular Sunday al-
most two thousand years ago.32 
 
Borg believes that this truth about Easter can be verified 
through different people's experiences, but not through some 
historical or scientific verification. He does not necessarily be-
lieve in the physical resurrection of Jesus, but still accepts that 
dramatic visions or mystical experiences of Jesus are an ex-
pression of the truth: "I think visions and apparitions can be 
true, by which I mean truthful disclosures of the way things 
are. I do not put them in the category of hallucinations."33 I 
agree with Borg that these are experiences that could not be 
empirically verified with our five senses, or as Borg says, 
would not be caught on a video camera.34 But Borg delineates 
between visions, which are truthful disclosures of the way 
things are, and hallucinations, which are not truthful disclo-
sures of the way things are. So while he initially may seem to 
avoid issues of historical accuracy, and thus his arguments 
would not able to be evaluated by something like Bayes' theo-
rem, he still must discern between whether a particular expe-
rience is a vision or hallucination. By making this distinguish-
ment, Borg opens the door for questioning the validity of 
someone's experience. How should we question the validity of 
                                                
32 Marcus Borg and N.T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus: Two Vi-
sions (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 135. 
33 Ibid., 133. 
34 Ibid., 132. 
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someone's experience? Do we assess the credibility of the in-
dividual who had the experience, and see whether the truth ex-
perienced lines up with other evidence we have? See how this 
is no different than what we did in the case study about Hume 
and miracles. So while Borg successfully posits that certain 
experiences cannot be evaluated through the five senses (or 
cannot be seen by a video camera), he is still in a sense stuck 
in the modern worldview by having to distinguish between the 
truth of certain dramatic experiences. 
 If we are still left in a situation where there must be 
some way to analyze the truthfulness of certain experiences or 
events in the bible, what should that standard be? In suggesting 
how we can see if it is possible that Jesus could have raised an 
individual from the dead (or been himself physically resur-
rected), Renan posits that a modern day thaumaturgus would 
need to prove that resurrection is indeed possible, and the 
power is to resurrect is vested within certain individuals: 
  
A commission... would be named. This commission 
would choose a corpse, would assure itself that the 
death was real... If, under such conditions, the resur-
rection were effected, a probability almost equal to 
certainty would be established. As, however, it ought 
to be possible always to repeat an experiment... the 
thaumaturgus would be invited to reproduce his mar-
velous act under other circumstances.35 
 
For all the modern day thaumaturgi reading this, (after all, you 
are my target audience) the bar has not been set low. Wright 
describes this sort of approach to verifying biblical stories: "It 
is proposed that the way to study Jesus is to break the material 
                                                
35 Ernest Renan, The Life of Jesus (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus 
Books, 1991), 22. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furman Humanities Review 
 60 
down into its component parts and to evaluate these on the ba-
sis of certain rules."36 In this case the relevant parts are resur-
rection stories, and the rule is, can resurrections be proved via 
the scientific method? Wright offers a different method that he 
still describes as, "the scientific method of hypothesis and ver-
ification,"37 but yet looks nothing like what Renan describes 
above.  
The researcher, after a period of total and sometimes 
confusing immersion in the data, emerges with a hy-
pothesis, a big picture of how everything fits to-
gether... it is tested against three criteria: Does it make 
sense of the data as they stand? Does it have an appro-
priate level of simplicity, or even elegance? Does it 
shed light on areas of research other than the one it 
was designed to cover?38 
 
Wright notes that within biblical studies there is no universally 
agreed upon way to decide what gets to count as appropriate 
answers and evidence for these questions. This is certainly the 
subject of much debate. For the purpose of this paper, see how 
the answers to Wright's first question in particular invite the 
sorts of probabilistic language used in the discussion of Hume 
and miracles. As Wright notes, the data does not always pre-
sent a coherent picture.39 So pieces of data must be weighed 
against one another. This comes to light when the biblical his-
torian tries to piece together the relationship between the four 
gospels: when was each written, which gospel copied from 
which other gospel, and what other sources were used? Wright 
describes how  
 
                                                
36 Marcus Borg and N.T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus: Two Vi-
sions (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 23. 
37 Ibid., 22. 
38 Ibid.,, 22. 
39 Ibid., 20. 
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Mutually incompatible theories abound as to where, 
when, and why the synoptic gospels came to final 
form. Since there is no agreement about sources, there 
is no agreement as to how and why the different evan-
gelists used them. If, for instance, we believe that Mat-
thew used Mark, we can discuss Matthew's theology 
on the basis of his editing of Mark. If we don't believe 
Matthew used Mark, we can't.40   
 
These arguments quickly become about if-then statements, or 
probabilities of occurrence: regardless of whether of one's def-
inition of a scientific method for historical analysis lines up 
with Renan or Wright, logical and mathematical reasoning be-
comes crucial in order to understand the arguments at hand.     
 From this survey of important biblical historians and 
scholars, we can conclude that mathematical language and 
probabilistic reasoning have an important role to play in ascer-
taining the truth, however one wishes to define it, of biblical 
narratives. Biblical historians' work is replete with argumen-
tation that utilizes probabilistic reasoning, and is thus able to 
be analyzed through techniques such as Bayes' theorem. This 
means that to be able to assess the quality of arguments of phi-
losophers, theologians, and historians, a degree of mathemati-
cal literacy may be required. I will now conclude with a story 
of how a bit of mathematical intuition may be helpful beyond 
the realm of biblical studies and miracles. Consider the story 
of Stanislav Petrov, former officer in the Soviet Air Defense 
Force, known as "the man who saved the world" from nuclear 
war in 1983. Petrov was in charge of monitoring the Soviet 
satellites that were supposed to tell the Air Defense Force 
when an American ballistic missile was in the air. At this time 
the Soviet Union was on high alert, as they had recently shot 
down a civilian airliner, killing 269 people on board, including 
62 Americans (among them was a sitting U.S. congressman). 
                                                
40 Marcus Borg and N.T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus: Two Vi-
sions (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 21. 
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Fearing retaliation, one day Petrov's radar screen showed five 
missiles had been launched by the U.S. towards the Soviet Un-
ion. Petrov claimed he had a "gut instinct,"41 that this was a 
false alarm. Petrov noted that it would be odd for the U.S. to 
launch a strike, but to only send five missiles, instead of send-
ing a salvo of hundreds. And while the satellites were certainly 
set up to prevent a false alarm, Petrov recognized that there 
was still the possibility for failure. Needing to make a decision 
fast, Petrov decided to not inform his superiors that missiles 
were on the way; only when sufficient time had passed and no 
missiles hit the Soviet Union did Petrov know he had made the 
right call. While Petrov most certainly was not frantically 
scribbling out Bayes' Theorem, his intuition lines up with the 
mathematical logic of conditional probability. Petrov's prior 
knowledge was that the chance that the U.S. would launch a 
strike was low, and if they did, they would most likely launch 
hundreds of missiles at once, not five. Petrov then had to up-
date his knowledge based on new information: he saw five 
missiles on his radar. The question, expressed using Bayesian 
conditional probabilities: what is the probability the Ameri-
cans are beginning a missile attack on the Soviet Union, given 
that the radar is showing five missiles coming towards the So-
viet Union on the screen? This is the same question that Hume 
asks, only instead of in the realm of miracles, it was in the 
realm of nuclear defense. Given this, perhaps Thomas Bayes 
should also get the moniker, the man who saved the world? 
  
                                                
41 Marc Bennetts, "Soviet Officer who Averted Cold War Nuclear 
disaster dies aged 77," The Guardian, September 18, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/18/soviet-officer-
who-averted-cold-war-nuclear-disaster-dies-aged-77  
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